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Abstract 
This study examines how income-driven governance affects inclusive human development in 
Sub-Saharan Africa with data for the period 2000-2012. The empirical evidence is based on the 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) and Tobit regressions. Nine bundled and unbundled 
concepts of governance are used: political (voice & accountability and political stability/no 
violence), economic (government effectiveness and regulation quality) and institutional 
(corruption-control and the rule of law) governances. The main finding is that ‘middle income’-
driven governance has a higher effect on inclusive human development than ‘low income’-
driven governance. Policy implications are discussed in the light of: (i) the contemporary 
relevance of findings; (ii) the pivotal role of a higher income level in the post-2015 sustainable 
development agenda; and (iii) inconsistent strands in the literature and in foreign aid policies. 
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1. Introduction 
 There are three main motivations for positioning an inquiry on the linkages between 
governance, inclusive human development and the importance of income levels in Africa, 
notably: (i) disturbing extreme poverty trends in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and the role of 
institutions in inclusive development; (ii) documented positive development externalities from 
rising income levels and (iii) gaps in the literature on the nexus between income levels and 
inclusive development in Africa.  
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 First, an April 2015 World Bank report on Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
targets has shown that whereas extreme poverty has been decreasing in all regions of the world, 
it has been increasing in SSA. According to the account, about 45 percent of countries in the sub-
region were substantially off-track in reaching the MDG extreme poverty target (World Bank, 
2015; Asongu & le Roux, 2019; Tchamyou, 2019, 2019b; Tchamyou et al., 2019; Asongu & 
Odhiambo, 2019a). This worrisome trend is amid the sub-region enjoying more than two decades 
of growth resurgence that commenced in the mid-1990s (Fosu, 2015a,). This has led to a recent 
strand of literature devoted to, inter alia: elucidating paradigm shifts needed to understand 
Africa’s poverty tragedy (Kuada, 2015) and assessing the role of institutions in Africa’s growth 
recovery in order to know if the recent growth episode is a myth or reality (Fosu, 2015b, 2015c). 
Moreover, good governance has been documented to be strongly associated with inclusive 
development, notably in improving living standards through better resource management (Fosu, 
2013a, 2013b; Anyanwu & Erhijakpor, 2014; Fonchingong, 2014) and consolidating the 
foundations of social change (Efobi, 2015).  
 Second, rising income levels are important in contemporary African development 
because it has been shown to be associated with a plethora of positive development externalities, 
particularly: (i) historical evidence on higher income levels as a driving factor in the 
development of North America and Europe in the nineteenth century (Adelman & Morris, 1997; 
Landes, 1998) and (ii) more contemporary evidence of higher income levels in stimulating social 
progress (Sridharan, 2004), institutional reforms (Loyza et al., 2012), democracy (Kodila-Tedika 
et al., 2016), good institutions (Birdsall, 2007a), poverty mitigation (Easterly, 2001), 
entrepreneurship and innovation  (Banerjee & Duflo, 2009) and inclusive development (Birdsall, 
2010).  
 Third, contemporary African-specific development literature (which we cover in greater 
depth in Section 2) on higher income levels can be discussed in four main categories, namely: 
measurement concerns of the phenomenon (Resnick, 2015a;  Tschirley et al., 2015; Cheeseman, 
2015; Mattes, 2015; Resnick, 2015b; Thurlow et al., 2015; Shimeles & Ncube, 2015); linkages 
between higher income levels and economic growth (Handley, 2015;  Tschirley et al., 2015 ); 
relationships between income levels and institutions (Cheeseman, 2015; Mattes, 2015;  Resnick , 
2015b) and the role of higher income levels in contemporary development paradigms (Asongu & 
Ssozi, 2016; Asongu, 2016).  
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 Noticeably, the above literature leaves room for improvement in three main dimensions, 
notably, the: (i) need to incorporate inclusive human development in the light of post-2015 
sustainable development goals; (ii) articulate the effect of governance on inclusive development; 
and (iii) examination of the role of income levels in the effect of governance on inclusive human 
development. This study fills identified gaps by investigating the role of income levels in the 
relationship between governance and inclusive human development.  In an effort to find room 
for policy implications, nine bundled and unbundled governance indicators are used. They are: 
political governance (consisting of voice & accountability and political stability/no violence); 
economic governance (entailing government effectiveness and regulation quality); and 
institutional governance (encompassing corruption-control and the rule of law).  
 Two main contemporary paradigm shifts motivate this inquiry. First, the imperative for 
macroeconomic reforms which embody more of the middle-class values and aspirations as 
opposed to a uniform growth policy (Birdsall, 2007b). Second, the need to transform from 
‘strong economics’ (or structural adjustment policies) to ‘soft economics’ (or human capability 
development) in order to understand Africa’s extreme poverty tragedy (Kuada, 2015).  
 The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the intuition, theoretical 
underpinnings and the relevant literature pertaining to the relationship between the African 
wealth and economic development. The data and methodology are covered in Section 3. Section 
4 presents the empirical results and corresponding discussion, while Section 5 concludes with 
suggestions for future research directions.  
 
2. Intuition, theoretical underpinnings and literature 
2.1 African wealth in the terms of the middle class and economic development  
 Contemporary African-specific development literature on African wealth levels can be 
discussed in four main categories, namely: (i) measurement concerns of the phenomenon; (ii) 
linkages between the middle class and economic growth; (iii) connection between the middle 
class and institutions and (iv) the role of the middle class in contemporary development 
paradigms. 
In the first category on the appreciation of the middle class in Africa, consistent with 
Resnick (2015a), its conception and measurement depend on the line of inquiry under 
consideration. More specifically (i) whether absolute expenditure and income indicators are 
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worthwhile when examining patterns of consumption (Tschirley et al., 2015) and (ii) if the 
assessment is on democratic values (e.g. political activism), a combination of asset or income 
metrics arising from employment and education levels (Cheeseman, 2015; Mattes, 2015; 
Resnick, 2015b). Thurlow et al. (2015) have made propositions on the conceptualization and 
measurement of the African middle class. According to the authors, the middle class of the 
continent need not have reduced, primarily because the region is characterized by a relatively 
low cost of living. Additionally, they contend that a universal concept of the status of the middle 
class consists of prospects of social mobility and protection from economic vulnerability. To this 
end, they suggested three indicators for a minimum threshold of the African middle class. They 
are: (i) skilled employed; (ii) secondary school completion and (iii) households with basic 
amenities like electricity, flush toilets and piped water.  
 Second, some studies have assessed the relationship between Africa’s middle class and 
economic growth. Handley (2015) has argued that the effect of the middle class on economic 
growth is substantially contingent on the strong association between the middle class and the 
private sector instead of the public sector. The former sector is important because a plethora of 
positive factors are associated with the middle class; notably employment, innovation, pressure 
on the state and demand for commodities. Tschirley et al. (2015) have assessed the effect of the 
middle class on patterns in food consumption to establish that the middle class and the poor 
allocate a substantial portion of their food budget to processed food and still considerably depend 
on locally-processed food in the long-term. 
 In the third category on the relationship between the middle class and institutions, 
Cheeseman (2015) has investigated the nexus between the Kenyan middle class and democracy 
in the country to establish that education is the most substantive determinant of democracy with 
secondary and tertiary educations very strongly favourable. Linkages between the middle class’ 
values, trust in government and political participation were examined by Resnick (2015b) in 
Zambia using the 2008 Governance Survey to conclude that, compared to the poor; the middle 
class of the country is not very likely to vote and are less trustful of government institutions.  
 The last strand builds on the role of the middle class in contemporary development 
paradigms. Authors in this category have used a rising middle class to reconcile the two 
contemporary dominant models of development, namely: the Washington Consensus and the 
Beijing model. Whereas Asongu and Ssozi (2016) provided strategies and solutions to policy 
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syndromes in Sino-African relations, Asongu (2016) has reviewed and reconciled dominant 
schools of thought in Sino-African relations. These authors are in agreement on the importance 
of the middle class in driving political governance in a sustainable manner. According to their 
narrative, African countries which are at the early stages of industrialisation should pursue 
policies that prioritise economic governance in accordance with the Beijing model instead of 
political governance emphasised in the Washington Consensus. The authors further suggest that 
the Beijing (Washington) model should be pursued as a short- (long-) term development goal 
because of the requirement that only a burgeoning middle class may be trusted to sustain the 
demand for improvements in political rights and civil liberties.  
 
2.2 Intuition for the linkage between income levels and inclusive development  
Consistent with   Boushey and Hersh (2012), the implications of higher income levels have not 
been clearly incorporated in economic growth theories. Hence, in what follows, we discuss the 
intuition for investigating the association between income levels and inclusive development. 
Such intuition is important because applied econometrics should not be exclusively limited to the 
acceptance and/or rejection of existing economic theories. Hence, we join a recent strand of 
literature in postulating that, investigating economic phenomena based on sound intuition is a 
useful scientific activity because it could set the stage for theory-building (Costantini & Lupi, 
2005; Narayan et al., 2011; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2018). The intuition for the connection 
between a higher income level and inclusive development can be discussed in four main strands, 
notably, the relationships between a higher income level and education, health and long life, 
living standards and inequality.  Whereas the first three are consistent with the Human 
Development Index (HDI), the fourth articulates the inclusive dimension of the HDI. The 
connections are discussed in chronological order.  
 First, with regard to the relationship between a higher income level and education, a 
higher income level increases the development of human capital and by extension a well-
educated population (Kharas, 2010; Tsang, 2013). In this light, a child from a moderate-income 
background is more likely to improve his/her talents compared to a child from low-income strata. 
It follows that the difference in social class (e.g. low income versus middle income) can 
influence disparities in the use of and access to education and human capital, which ultimately 
have some incidence on human development.  
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 Second, on the connection between a higher income level, health and long life, it is 
logical that the demand for commodities increases with rising income levels. Such commodities 
include health services which are positively associated with the life expectancy dimension of the 
HDI. Moreover, increasing domestic demand from higher incomes naturally leads to more 
employment, higher investment and economic growth.  Third, the underlying positive 
externalities from an increase in aggregate demand from the population with higher income 
levels on the one hand and improvements in supply by economic sectors (agricultural, industrial 
and service) on the other hand, ultimately engenders a creation of wealth and increases general 
living standards which are reflected in the income component of the HDI.  
 Fourth, income levels have been documented to support inclusive political, economic, 
and institutional governance (Boushey & Hersh, 2012). Moreover, governance has been 
established to have an indirect effect on multidimensional poverty through average income 
(Tebaldi & Mohan, 2010; Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2018). Two insights are important here for 
our study. On the one hand, the foundations of income-driven governance are substantiated by 
attendant literature. On the other hand, inclusiveness as the outcome of “middle-class”-driven 
governance entails inequality-adjusted human development. We substantiate the linkages with 
conceptual clarifications of governance. The definitions of governance are consistent with recent 
literature (Oluwatobi et al., 2015; Ajide & Raheem, 2016a, 2016b; Amavilah et al., 2017). (i) 
Political governance which is the election and replacement of political leaders can affect 
inclusive development because “political stability/no violence” and “voice & accountability” 
which represent political governance influence the equitable distribution of constituents of the 
HDI. For instance, in the presence of political instability and violence, some conditions of human 
development are likely to be negatively affected, inter alia:  life expectancy, education and the 
wealth of nations. Moreover, “voice & accountability” is essential to enable the population to 
choose leaders that can improve general wellbeing. (ii)  Economic governance (proxied with 
regulation quality and government effectiveness) is the formulation and implementation of 
policies that deliver public commodities. These public commodities include education and health 
services that are components of the HDI. (iii) Institutional governance (measured with 
corruption-control and the rule of law) in respect of the State and citizens of institutions that 
govern interactions between them. These institutions have as prime objectives the delivery of 
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public commodities and boosting of economic prosperity. The former entails education and 
health services, whereas the latter reflects the income dimension of the HDI. 
 Having provided the intuition for income-driven inclusive development, it is worthwhile 
to assess whether the intuition underpinning the study withstands empirical scrutiny.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data  
 The study examines a panel of forty-nine SSA countries with data from the African 
Development Indicators of the World Bank for the period 2000-2012. The starting year 2000 is 
in accordance with a recent phase of a rising income levels in Africa (Shimeles & Ncube, 2015) 
whereas the end date 2012 is due to constraints in data availability.  In accordance with recent 
African inclusive development literature, the dependent variable is the inequality-adjusted 
human development index (IHDI) (Asongu et al., 2015). The IHDI is the national average of 
achievements in three main areas, namely: (i) knowledge; (ii) health and long life; and (iii) 
decent standards of living. In addition to accounting for average rewards in terms of health, 
education and health, the IHDI also accounts for the distribution of underlying achievements 
among the population by controlling for mean values of each dimension with regards to 
inequality.  
The six governance indicators from Kaufmann et al. (2010) are bundled for three 
composite governance measurements. They are: (i) voice & accountability and political 
stability/no violence for political governance; (ii) regulation quality and government 
effectiveness for economic governance; and (iii) the rule of law and corruption-control for 
institutional governance. These governance indicators have been used in recent institutional 
literature (Gani, 2011; Yerrabit & Hawkes, 2015; Andrés et al., 2015; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 
2016a).  
 Classification of countries into income groups is consistent with the World Bank’s 
income thresholds: low income, $1,005 a year or less; lower middle income, $1,006-$3,975; 
upper middle income, $3,976-$12,275 and high income, $12,276 or more (Asongu, 2014, p. 
364). Adopted control indicators are Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita growth, foreign 
direct investment (FDI), private domestic credit and remittances. In line with recent inclusive 
development literature, a positive nexus is expected between these conditioning variables and the 
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IHDI (Mishra et al., 2011; Anand et al., 2012; Seneviratne & Sun, 2013; Mlachila et al., 2017). 
In principle (i) FDI, per capita economic growth and credit facilities have positive effects on 
inclusive growth (Mlachila et al., 2017); and (ii) remittances which are predominantly used for 
consumption purposes are very likely to contribute to inclusive growth (Mlachila et al., 2017; 
Ssozi & Asongu, 2016). It is also important to balance the narrative on expected signs because: 
(i) per capita GDP growth is expected to increase inclusive development only if the fruits from 
economic prosperity are equitably distributed; (ii) credit facilities that are not broad-based may 
not result in the expected inclusive outcome; and (iii) FDI has been recently established to 
increase inequality in Africa (Asongu & Tchamyou, 2015).  
 The definition and sources of variables are disclosed in Appendix 1, whereas a summary 
of the statistics is presented in Appendix 2. The correlation matrix is provided in Appendix 3. In 
Appendix 2, the means of indicators are comparable and are from corresponding variations (or 
standard deviations), so we can be confident that reasonably estimated linkages will emerge. The 
purpose of Appendix 3 is to mitigate issues of multicollinearity. From a preliminary assessment, 
high degrees of substitution are apparent among governance variables. In order to address the 
concern, the governance indicators are employed exclusively as independent variables in distinct 
specifications.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
 We have observed from the correlation matrix that there is a high degree of substitution 
between governance indicators. We partially deal with this anxiety by bundling governance 
variables through principal component analysis (PCA). The PCA is a statistical technique that 
enables the reduction of a highly correlated set of variables into an uncorrelated set of indicators 
called principal components. These represent a substantial proportion of variability in the initial 
dataset.  
 The Kaiser (1974) and Jolliffe (2002) criterion is used to retain principal components 
(PCs). They have recommended that only PCs with an eigenvalue that is higher than the mean 
should be retained. For example, in Table 1, it is apparent that political governance (Polgov) has 
an eigenvalue of 1.671 and accounts for 83.50 percent of variation or information in the 
constituent indicators (voice & accountability and political stability). The same logic applies to 
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the retention of common factors pertaining to economic governance (Ecogov) and institutional 
governance (Instgov). Political governance is the election and replacement of political leaders. 
Economic governance, which involves government effectiveness and regulation quality denotes 
the capacity of the government to formulate and implement policies that deliver public 
commodities. Institutional governance, which consists of the corruption-control and the rule of 
law represents the respect by citizens and the state of institutions that govern the interactions 
among them. PC-augmented governance regressors have recently been shown to be consistent, 
efficient and valid in terms of their empirical inferences (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b; 
Tchamyou, 2017). 
 
Table 1: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for Governance (Gov) 
Principal 
Components 
Component Matrix (Loadings) Proportion Cumulative 
Proportion 
Eigen 
Value 
 VA PS RQ GE RL CC    
          
First PC (Polgov) 0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.835 0.835 1.671 
Second PC -0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.164 1.000 0.328 
          
First PC (Ecogov) --- --- 0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.939 0.939 1.878 
Second PC --- --- -0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.060 1.000 0.121 
          
First PC (Instgov) --- --- --- --- 0.707 0.707 0.930 0.930 1.861 
Second PC --- --- --- --- -0.707 0.707 0.069 1.000 0.138 
          
P.C: Principal Component. VA: Voice & Accountability. RL: Rule of Law. R.Q: Regulation Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness. PS: 
Political Stability. CC: Control of Corruption. Polgov (Political Governance): First PC of VA & PS. Ecogov (Economic Governance): First PC of 
RQ & GE. Instgov (Institutional Governance): First PC of RL & CC.  
  
 
3.2.2 Estimation technique  
 Two estimation techniques are adopted in order to control for the persistence and limited 
range in the dependent variable. The Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) is employed to 
account for persistence in the dependent variable. Accordingly, the correlation between the IHDI 
and its first lag is 0.999, which is higher than the rule of thumb threshold of 0.800 needed to 
ascertain persistence. Asongu (2013) reported that there are at least three reasons for adopting 
the GMM approach. They comprise the fact that it (i) controls for potential endogeneity in all 
regressors; (ii) reduces potential biases of the difference estimator in small samples and (iii) does 
not eliminate cross-country differences (Efobi et al., 2018, 2019; Akinyemi et al., 2019; Fosu & 
Abass, 2019). It is principally for the second reason that Bond et al. (2001) have recommended 
that the system GMM estimators publicised by Blundell & Bond (1998) and Arellano & Bover, 
(1995) be preferred to the difference estimator by Arellano & Bond, (1991). Roodman (2009a, 
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2009b), Love & Zicchino, (2006); Baltagi, (2008) extended the Arellano and Bover (1995) 
method by employing forward orthogonal deviations instead of conventional first differences. 
They recognised that such transformation helps to limit instrument proliferation and to control 
for cross sectional dependence (Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017; Boateng et al., 2018). The current 
study adopts this modified GMM estimation approach. Besides, a two-step GMM specification is 
preferred to the one-step approach because it accounts for heteroscedasticity.  
The following equations in levels (1) and first difference (2) summarize the standard 
system GMM estimation procedure.  
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where, tiIHD ,  
is the inclusive human development of country i
 
in  period t ;  represents the 
lagged coefficient; 0  is a constant; 
G , Governance (Voice & accountability, political stability/ 
no violence, political governance, government effectiveness, regulation quality, economic 
governance, corruption-control, rule of law and institutional governance) ; IL , income levels;  
GIL , interaction between Governance  (G) and income levels  (IL);
 
W  is the vector of control 
variables  (GDP per capita growth, Private domestic credit, Remittances and Foreign direct 
investment);
 i

 
is the country-specific effect; t  
is the time-specific constant and ti ,  the error 
term.  
 Given that the IHDI falls within the range of 0 and 1, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) may 
be inappropriate. A double-censored Tobit model has been employed in the literature to account 
for a limited range in dependent variables (Kumbhakar & Lovell, 2000; Koetter et al., 2008; 
Coccorese & Pellecchia, 2010; Ariss, 2010). Consistent with recent literature (see   McDonald, 
2009; Coccorese & Pellecchia, 2010; Ajide et al., 2019), in situations where there are no 
observations of 0 or 1 for the IHDI (which is the present case), employing a double-censored 
Tobit model is similar to estimating a linear regression model because the two likelihood 
functions coincide. Hence, the logistic regression linked to the Tobit model is as follows: 
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where itx  is the same vector of regressors used in the Tobit model,  is the vector of parameters  
and it is  independently and identically distributed (iid) with mean zero and ² variance.  
 Given that robustness checks consist of employing an estimation strategy that 
encompasses interactive regressions, it is important to highlight some pitfalls that are linked to 
such interactive regressions (Brambor et al., 2006; Asongu & Odhiambo, 2019b). In the 
specification exercise, all constituent variables are entered into the regressions.  
 
4. Empirical results  
4.1 Presentation of results  
 Tables 2 and 3 present results corresponding to GMM and Tobit regressions, 
respectively. Each table is presented in three panels: Panel A for the full sample, Panel B on low-
income countries and Panel C on middle-income countries. Whereas Tobit regressions are 
specified with data of annual periodicity, GMM regressions are based on two-year non-
overlapping intervals in order to mitigate instrument proliferation.  
 Four main information criteria are used to assess the validity of the GMM findings. First, 
the alternative hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR [2]) in 
difference for the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals should be rejected.  Second, 
alternative hypotheses of the Sargan and Hansen over-identification restrictions (OIR) tests 
should also be rejected because they are for the positions that instruments are correlated with the 
error terms, implying they are invalid. Accordingly, whereas the Hansen OIR test is weakened 
by instruments but robust, the Sargan OIR test is not weakened by instruments and not robust. 
Third, the Sargan OIR and Hansen OIR tests are complemented with the Difference in Hansen 
Test (DHT) for instruments exogeneity. Fourth, a Fisher test is also provided for the joint 
validity of estimated coefficients.  
 The following findings can be established for Table 2. (1) Governance dynamics 
consistently improve inclusive human development. (2) With the exceptions of economic and 
institutional governances, governance increases inclusive human development with a higher 
magnitude in middle-income nations compared to low-income countries. (3) GDP per capita 
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growth and private domestic credit possibly do not have the expected signs respectively because 
of immiserizing growth and substantial allocation of credit to rich households and companies. In 
essence, as emphasized in the introduction, extreme poverty has been increasing in SSA because 
of exclusive growth. Private domestic credit may not benefit a substantial bulk of the population 
if poor households in the informal sectors of the economy do not have bank accounts. This is 
consistent with the narrative that only 23 percent of citizens in developing countries living on 
less the 2US$ a day possess bank accounts (Asongu & Tchamyou, 2015). The negative effect of 
remittances may be traceable to the portion of remittances that is not invested in inclusive 
development activities.  
 In Table 3 (i) governance indicators consistently increase inclusive human development 
with the magnitude from middle-income countries consistently higher and (ii) the significant 
control variable has the expected sign.   
Table 2: Inclusive development and governance (Non-interactive GMM) 
          
 Dependent Variable: Inequality Adjusted Human Development (IHDI) 
 Panel A: Full Sample 
          
 Political Governance Economic Governance Institutional Governance 
 Political 
Stability 
(PolS) 
Voice & 
Accountability 
(VA) 
Political 
governance 
(Polgov) 
Government 
Effectiveness 
(GE) 
Regulation 
Quality(RQ) 
Economic 
Governance 
(Ecogov) 
Corruption-
Control  
(CC) 
Rule of 
Law (RL) 
Institutional 
Governance 
(Instgov) 
          
Constant  1.322*** 1.299*** 0.873*** 1.204*** 1.238*** 0.666*** 1.149*** 1.245*** 0.801*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IHDI(-1) -0.027*** -0.021*** -0.041*** -0.011*** -0.020*** -0.040*** -0.024*** -0.013*** -0.015*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Political Stability (PolS) 0.997*** --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000)         
Voice & Accountability(VA) --- 1.002*** --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
  (0.000)        
Political Governance (Polgov) --- --- 1.051*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
   (0.000)       
Government Effectiveness(GE) --- --- --- 0.971*** --- --- --- --- --- 
    (0.000)      
Regulation Quality (RQ) --- --- --- --- 0.965*** --- --- --- --- 
     (0.000)     
Economic Governance(Ecogov) --- --- --- --- --- 1.004*** --- --- --- 
      (0.000)    
Corruption-Control (CC) --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.953*** --- --- 
       (0.000)   
Regulation Quality (RL) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.974*** --- 
        (0.000)  
Institutional Governance(Instgov) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.974*** 
         (0.000) 
          
GDP per capita growth -0.020*** -0.028*** -0.038*** -0.007*** -0.006** -0.010*** 0.00008 -0.011*** 0.009* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.012) (0.008) (0.979) (0.000) (0.078) 
Private Domestic Credit  -0.014** -0.014*** -0.027*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.023*** -0.005*** -0.007** -0.018*** 
 (0.016) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.007) 
Remittances  -0.024*** -0.013*** -0.040*** -0.010** -0.002* -0.019** -0.0001 -0.011** -0.023** 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.001) (0.011) (0.095) (0.037) (0.964) (0.024) (0.010) 
Foreign Direct Investment  0.005* -0.003*** 0.014*** 0.009*** 0.006*** 0.020*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.017*** 
 (0.072) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
          
AR(1) (0.521) (0.663) (0.456) (0.900) (0.772) (0.959) (0.932) (0.433) (0.614) 
AR(2) (0.663) (0.049) (0.892) (0.754) (0.409) (0.901) (0.630) (0.545) (0.222) 
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Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.154) (0.069) (0.093) (0.188) (0.319) (0.383) (0.071) (0.060) (0.363) 
DHT for instruments          
(a)Instruments in levels          
H excluding group (1.000) (0.988) (1.000) (0.983) (0.917) (0.989) (0.990) (0.986) (0.999) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.028) (0.011) (0.014) (0.044) (0.120) (0.125) (0.011) (0.009) (0.103) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))          
H excluding group (0.201) (0.121) (0.182) (0.119) (0.228) (0.296) (0.100) (0.095) (0.421) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.207) (0.124) (0.106) (0.578) (0.587) (0.564) (0.170) (0.144) (0.283) 
          
Fisher  311.45*** 3977.18*** 422.20*** 10306.15*** 6633.11*** 429.67*** 2004.49*** 5236.8*** 138.82*** 
Instruments  27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 
Countries  38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Observations  153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 
          
          
 Panel B: Low Income Countries 
          
Governance  0.915*** 0.961*** 0.966*** 0.938*** 0.950*** 0.947*** 0.926*** 0.955*** 0.930*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
          
AR(1) (0.369) (0.148) (0.125) (0.091) (0.541) (0.235) (0.440) (0.633) (0.495) 
AR(2) (0.354) (0.714) (0.651) (0.489) (0.321) (0.954) (0.960) (0.678) (0.802) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.268) (0.295) (0.212) (0.435) (0.436) (0.354) (0.311) (0.322) (0.340) 
DHT for instruments          
(a)Instruments in levels          
H excluding group (1.000) (0.999) (1.000) (0.968) (0.999) (1.000) (0.997) (0.997) (0.999) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.062) (0.074) (0.043) (0.168) (0.140) (0.097) (0.084) (0.088) (0.093) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))          
H excluding group (0.493) (0.507) (0.555) (0.418) (0.138) (0.340) (0.100) (0.345) (0.307) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.108) (0.123) (0.050) (0.419) (1.000) (0.394) (1.000) (0.320) (0.428) 
          
Fisher  1349.02*** 8428.54*** 2964.20*** 29768.36*** 19196.54*** 2282.64*** 24694.50*** 27150*** 3469.63*** 
Instruments  27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 
Countries  25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Observations  95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 
          
          
 Panel C: Middle Income Countries 
          
Governance 0.980*** 1.021* 0.991*** 0.968*** 0.961*** 0.928*** 0.934*** 0.966*** 0.915*** 
 (0.000) (0.074) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
          
AR(1) (0.261) (0.940) (0.484) (0.732) (0.297) (0.386) (0.087) (0.495) (0.289) 
AR(2) (0.917) (0.874) (0.432) (0.895) (0.402) (0.551) (0.063) (0.998) (0.863) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (1.000) (0.986) (0.991) (1.000) (1.000) (0.999) (0.984) (0.999) (0.996) 
DHT for instruments          
(a)Instruments in levels          
H excluding group (0.999) (0.972) (0.999) (0.927) (0.854) (0.988) (0.967) (0.999) (0.997) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.997) (0.917) (0.899) (1.000) (1.000) (0.992) (0.901) (0.986) (0.953) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))          
H excluding group (0.998) (0.908) (0.928) (0.999) (1.000) (0.990) (0.896) (0.990) (0.963) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
          
Fisher  392.91*** 3085.77*** 631.77*** 3248.39*** 2829.07*** 163.52*** 2466.31*** 1276.9*** 296.52*** 
Instruments  27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 
Countries  15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Observations  60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
          
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, 
Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the 
validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. na: thresholds and/or net effects cannot be computed because of insignificant marginal effects. 
Control variables were included in the specifications in Panels B-C.  
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Table 3: Inclusive development and governance (Non-interactive Tobit) 
          
 Dependent Variable: Inequality Adjusted Human Development (IHDI) 
 Panel A: Full Sample  
          
 Political Governance Economic Governance Institutional Governance 
 Political 
Stability 
(PolS) 
Voice & 
Accountability 
(VA) 
Political 
governance 
(Polgov) 
Government 
Effectiveness 
(GE) 
Regulation 
Quality(RQ) 
Economic 
Governance 
(Ecogov) 
Corruption-
Control  
(CC) 
Rule of 
Law (RL) 
Institutional 
Governance 
(Instgov) 
          
Constant  0.419*** 0.414*** 0.401*** 0.474*** 0.445*** 0.402*** 0.449*** 0.450*** 0.405*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PolS 0.034*** --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000)         
VA --- 0.023*** --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
  (0.008)        
Polgov --- --- 0.022*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
   (0.000)       
GE --- --- --- 0.085*** --- --- --- --- --- 
    (0.000)      
RQ --- --- --- --- 0.070*** --- --- --- --- 
     (0.000)     
Ecogov --- --- --- --- --- 0.038*** --- --- --- 
      (0.000)    
CC --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.071*** --- --- 
       (0.000)   
RL  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.060*** --- 
        (0.000)  
Instgov --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.031*** 
         (0.000) 
GDPpcg 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.0002 0.001 0.0009 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.148) (0.335) (0.279) (0.874) (0.215) (0.486) (0.365) (0.398) (0.399) 
Credit  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Remittances  -0.0001 -0.00008 -0.0001 -0.0003 0.00009 -0.0001 0.0007 -0.0004 0.0001 
 (0.791) (0.887) (0.764) (0.478) (0.862) (0.792) (0.207) (0.397) (0.850) 
FDI  0.00009 0.00009 0.00009 0.0009 0.0008 0.0009 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 
 (0.893) (0.890) (0.891) (0.140) (0.234) (0.147) (0.548) (0.502) (0.496) 
          
LR Chi-Square  140.56*** 113.12*** 128.88*** 165.12*** 140.57*** 156.80*** 150.48*** 144.98*** 151.22*** 
Log Likelihood 316.723 303.005 310.884 390.003 316.728 324.841 321.683 318.935 322.056 
Observations  310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 
          
          
 Panel B: Low Income Countries 
          
Governance  0.012* 0.015 0.010* 0.056*** 0.058*** 0.028*** 0.034** 0.034*** 0.017*** 
 (0.065) (0.115) (0.054) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.037) (0.006) (0.009) 
LR Chi-Square  11.02* 10.10* 11.34** 23.91*** 27.65*** 27.88*** 11.98** 15.19*** 14.51*** 
Log Likelihood 236.821 236.362 236.983 243.268 245.136 245.254 237.304 238.907 238.570 
Observations  191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 
          
 Panel C: Middle Income Countries 
          
Governance  0.058*** 0.065*** 0.043*** 0.097*** 0.085*** 0.043*** 0.071*** 0.082*** 0.035*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LR Chi-Square  133.59*** 89.79*** 120.08*** 111.37*** 90.09*** 102.78*** 96.85*** 119.71*** 109.14*** 
Log Likelihood 157.278 135.375 150.520 146.165 135.525 141.874 138.908 150.337 145.052 
Observations  119 119 119 119 119 119 119 119 119 
          
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth. Control 
variables were included in the specifications in Panels B-C.  
 
 
4.2 Robustness checks with Interactive regressions 
 Table 4 and Table 5 present robustness checks findings which are based on interactive 
GMM and Tobit regressions, respectively. Consistent with the methodology, the GMM (Tobit) 
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specification accounts for the persistence (limited range) of (in) the dependent variable. The 
comparison between middle-income and low-income countries is based on net effects. For 
instance, the net effect: (i) in the second column of Panel A in Table 4 is -0.014 ([-0.003× 0.627] 
- 0.013) while (ii) in the second-to-the last column of Panel B is -0.050 ([-0.047× 0.372] - 0.033). 
In other words, the net effect of low income on inclusive development is -0.014, whereas that of 
middle income is -0.050.  0.627 and 0.372 are respectively mean values of low-income and 
middle-income countries based on two-year non-overlapping intervals. This procedure for 
computing net effects from interactive regressions is consistent with recent empirical literature 
(Agoba et al., 2019; Asongu & Odhiambo, 2019c, 2019d;  Kriese et al., 2019).  From Table 4, 
with the exception of the first two specifications of institutional governance regressions, the net 
effects are not directly comparable. This is not the case with the Tobit model in Table 5. 
 In Table 5, the net effects of middle-income countries are consistently higher than those 
of low income countries. The procedure for their computations is still the same with the 
exception that since annual periodicities are used, the mean values of low-income and middle-
income countries on which the net effects are computed are respectively 0.632 and 0.367.  
 
Table 4: Inclusive development and governance (Interactive GMM) 
          
 Dependent Variable: Inequality Adjusted Human Development (IHDI) 
          
 Political Governance Economic Governance Institutional Governance 
   Political 
Stability  
(PolS) 
Voice & 
Accountability 
(VA)  
Political 
governance  
(Polgov) 
Government 
Effectiveness 
(GE) 
Regulation 
Quality(RQ) 
Economic 
Governance 
(Ecogov) 
Corruption-
Control  
(CC) 
Rule of Law 
(RL) 
Institutional 
Governance 
(Instgov) 
          
 Panel A: Low Income Countries 
          
Low Income (LI) -0.013** -0.004 -0.013 0.013 0.018 -0.006 -0.065*** 0.031** -0.0004 
 (0.037) (0.607) (0.183) (0.288) (0.357) (0.411) (0.000) (0.016) (0.972) 
Governance  0.007*** 0.012* 0.006* -0.0002 -0.012 0.005 0.026*** -0.011 0.001 
 (0.008) (0.075) (0.058) (0.978) (0.402) (0.383) (0.000) (0.279) (0.611) 
Governance×LI -0.003** -0.013 -0.008 0.031* 0.043 0.018 -0.056*** 0.047** 0.003 
 (0.445) (0.239) (0.239) (0.086) (0.104) (0.110) (0.000) (0.010) (0.727) 
Net Effect of LI -0.014 na na na na na -0.100 0.060 na 
          
AR(1) (0.205) (0.230) (0.206) (0.237) (0.249) (0.24) (0.215) (0.227) (0.239) 
AR(2) (0.994) (0.489) (0.695) (0.583) (0.602) (0.924) (0.177) (0.311) (0.639) 
Sargan OIR (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.700) (0.461) (0.630) (0.567) (0.649) (0.698) (0.754) (0.498) (0.620) 
DHT for instruments          
(a)Instruments in levels          
H excluding group (0.213) (0.210) (0.277) (0.132) (0.158) (0.288) (0.287) (0.163) (0.254) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.902) (0.650) (0.779) (0.874) (0.911) (0.843) (0.897) (0.761) (0.790) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))          
H excluding group (0.521) (0.587) (0.852) (0.558) (0.682) (0.578) (0.822) (0.389) (0.499) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.863) (0.220) (0.139) (0.440) (0.385) (0.725) (0.339) (0.651) (0.698) 
          
Fisher  974.32*** 5656.26*** 4623.12*** 827.53 *** 424.75*** 439.36*** 1098.48*** 431.48*** 2926.46*** 
Instruments  32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
Countries  37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 
Observations  150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 
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 Panel B: Middle Income Countries 
          
Middle  Income (MI) 0.014 0.023*** 0.010* -0.018 -0.013 0.009 0.055*** -0.033*** -0.006 
 (0.248) (0.001) (0.061) (0.283) (0.447) (0.287) (0.002) (0.003) (0.545) 
Governance  0.007* 0.005 -0.0003 0.039*** 0.033** 0.016*** -0.022 0.037*** -0.011 
 (0.062) (0.827) (0.932) (0.005) (0.018) (0.008) (0.107) (0.001) (0.129) 
Governance×MI -0.001 0.005 0.002 -0.038** -0.041* -0.020** 0.048*** -0.047*** -0.014 
 (0.850) (0.616) (0.681) (0.039) (0.054) (0.044) (0.006) (0.000) (0.168) 
Net Effect of  MI na na na na na na 0.072 -0.050 na 
          
AR(1) (0.197) (0.226) (0.219) (0.245) (0.244) (0.246) (0.226) (0.226) (0.245) 
AR(2) (0.686) (0.511) (0.651) (0.485) (0.591) (0.860) (0.213) (0.266) (0.869) 
Sargan OIR (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.856) (0.910) (0.912) (0.532) (0.736) (0.701) (0.712) (0.581) (0.610) 
DHT for instruments          
(a)Instruments in levels          
H excluding group (0.229) (0.264) (0.325) (0.213) (0.232) (0.336) (0.384) (0.206) (0.206) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.990) (0.996) (0.991) (0.754) (0.932) (0.824) (0.800) (0.817) (0.846) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))          
H excluding group (0.787) (0.795) (0.876) (0.579) (0.740) (0.648) (0.850) (0.401) (0.585) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.714) (0.919) (0.680) (0.334) (0.461) (0.573) (0.218) (0.855) (0.482) 
          
Fisher  1676.85*** 7976.08*** 827.53*** 426.09*** 842.89*** 514.94*** 1085.68*** 13960.42*** 1590.72*** 
Instruments  33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 
Countries  37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 
Observations  150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 
          
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, 
Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1)andAR(2) tests and; b) the 
validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. na: thresholds and/or net effects cannot be computed because of insignificant marginal effects. 
na: net effects cannot be computed because of insignificant marginal effects and/or unconditional Income effects. Control variables were included 
in the specifications in Panels A-B.  
 
Table 5: Inclusive development and governance (Interactive Tobit) 
          
 Dependent Variable: Inequality Adjusted Human Development (IHDI) 
          
 Political Governance Economic Governance Institutional Governance 
   Political 
Stability  
(PolS) 
Voice & 
Accountability 
(VA)  
Political 
governance  
(Polgov) 
Government 
Effectiveness 
(GE) 
Regulation 
Quality(RQ) 
Economic 
Governance 
(Ecogov) 
Corruption-
Control  
(CC) 
Rule of 
Law (RL) 
Institutional 
Governance 
(Instgov) 
          
 Panel A: Low Income Countries 
          
Low Income (LI) -0.137*** -0.148*** -0.115*** -0.138*** -0.128*** -0.102*** -0.135*** -0.145*** -0.106*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Governance  0.057*** 0.060*** 0.041*** 0.094*** 0.084*** 0.042*** 0.072*** 0.078*** 0.034*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Governance×LI -0.044*** -0.050*** -0.031*** -0.052*** -0.028 -0.017** -0.050*** -0.046*** -0.020** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.106) (0.031) (0.008) (0.003) (0.010) 
Net Effects -0.164 -0.179 -0.134 -0.170 na -0.112 -0.166 -0.174 -0.118 
          
LR Chi-Square  295.75*** 250.24*** 281.52*** 281.17*** 268.67*** 278.98*** 263.88*** 284.35*** 276.27*** 
Log Likelihood 394.321 371.563 387.204 387.028 380.780 385.934 378.382 388.619 384.578 
Observations  310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 
          
          
 Panel B: Middle Income Countries 
          
Middle  Income (MI) 0.137*** 0.148*** 0.115*** 0.138*** 0.128*** 0.102*** 0.135*** 0.145*** 0.106*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Governance  0.013** 0.010 0.009* 0.041*** 0.056*** 0.024*** 0.022 0.032** 0.014** 
 (0.044) (0.310) (0.082) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.163) (0.011) (0.034) 
Governance×MI 0.044*** 0.050*** 0.031*** 0.052*** 0.028 0.017** 0.050*** 0.046*** 0.020** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.106) (0.031) (0.008) (0.003) (0.010) 
Net Effects of MI 0.153 0.166 0.126 0.157 na 0.108 0.153 0.161 0.113 
          
LR Chi-Square  295.75*** 250.24*** 281.52*** 281.17*** 268.67*** 278.98*** 263.88*** 284.35*** 276.27*** 
Log Likelihood 394.321 371.563 387.204 387.028 380.780 385.934 378.382 388.619 384.578 
Observations  310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 
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*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. na: net effects cannot be computed because of insignificant marginal effects 
and/or unconditional Income effects. Control variables were included in the specifications in Panels A-B.  
 
4.3 Further discussion and policy implications 
 We have consistently established for the most part that, middle income compared to low 
income has a higher effect on how governance affects inclusive human development. In other 
words, ‘middle income-driven governance has a higher effect on inclusive development 
compared with the impact of ‘low income-driven governance. This is broadly in accordance with 
postulations in previous literature documenting positive outcomes from rising income levels. 
These include improved governance standards for a broader social good (Birdsall, 2007a; 
Easterly, 2001; Resnick, 2015a).  Middle income is more effective at driving governance for 
inclusive development, notably, the election and replacement of political leaders (or political 
governance); formulation and implementation of policies that deliver public commodities 
(economic governance) and respect by state and citizens of institutions that govern interactions 
between them (institutional governance).  
The rest of the discourse is covered in four main strands. They are: (i) the contemporary 
relevance of the findings; (ii) pivotal role of higher income levels in the post-2015 sustainable 
development agenda; (iii) inconsistency of the findings with a strand of the literature 
documenting (iv) the negative influence of higher incomes levels on governance and 
implications for aid policies.  
 First, from a contemporary perspective, the findings are inconsistent with Rodrik (2015) 
who is pessimistic in his stance that the service sector’s expansion and industrialisation in Africa 
could stifle pro-democratic pressures and provoke greater political instability. Hence, contrary to 
Rodrik (2015), rising income levels in Africa and service sector may not only have an important 
role in consolidating governance structures, but could also play a major role in strengthening 
government structures for inclusive human development. Hence, whereas van de Walle (2012) 
argued that the labour unions that demanded the improvement of government structures in 
Europe and North America do not prevail in  modern African institutional structures (especially 
at the advent of multiparty politics in the 1990s), the dynamics of ‘citizenry protests and 
demands’ in contemporary Africa and historical Europe and North America are not parallel. 
Accordingly, with the events of the 2011 Arab Spring, the advent of information and 
communication technology (ICT) has shown that mobilizing an organised common conscience to 
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demand better governance can be spectacularly successful without labour unions and political 
parties.  
 Second, the role of a higher income level for inclusive human development in the post-
2015 development agenda may be parallel to a similar critical role played by the nascent higher 
income levels that contributed to independence across Africa in the 1960s (Sklar, 1963). The big 
difference, however, is that whereas after independence, one-party politics became the order of 
the day across the continent and stifled the democratic process, the contemporary African middle 
income category is now less likely to accept a reversal of the ongoing democratic processes in 
Africa. Recent examples involving the leading role of the African middle income strata in the 
demand for better governance for inclusive development include protests on: Zambia’s Black 
Friday and Benin’s Red Wednesday in 2013 respectively for less restrictive laws on civil society 
groups and no change in the constitution for an extension of the presidential mandate. The 
Burkina Faso revolution that also prevented the president from changing the Constitution for 
another term in office in 2014 is another eloquent testimony.  
 Third, the findings of this study run counter to the stream of opinions sympathetic to the 
perspective that not all middle income segments may demand better governance for inclusive 
development because of, inter alia; their dependence on the resources of the state and preference 
for specific markets (Poulton, 2014). Accordingly, while we concur with the reality that there is 
a middle income category in Africa prepared to stifle good governance in order to promote its 
vested interests, a majority of the African middle income strata has embraced Western values 
and is conscious of the fact that poor governance is very likely to contribute in the long-term to 
reducing their living standards. We, therefore, argue that frustrations from circles of the middle 
income category on improvements in governance standards are substantially traceable to a 
middle income fraction with political connections, as opposed to another middle income fraction 
that is genuinely earning more from innovation, free enterprise and the market economy. Hence, 
while we may partially agree with the narrative of Rodrik (2015) on the African middle income 
category’s relevance in stalled political transformations and the position of Poulton (2014) on the 
skillful use of external threats by African dictatorships to retain a tight grip on power, 
governance is a concept that should not be skewed towards political transformations. In essence, 
stable African dictatorships and quasi-democracies could still enjoy significant economic and 
institutional governances while displaying political stability.  
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 The following is relevant to the counter factual explanations. There are several ways in 
which the middle income category can drive inclusive governance. Some include demand for 
quality education, better health services and social protection amenities that contribute to 
learning outcomes and life expectancy. The underpinning logic here is that once these services 
are demanded by the middle income group, those in the lower income strata would automatically 
benefit given that these are services provided by the government and/or private sector that are 
improved by institutional governance reforms.  For instance, government policies affect public 
and private schools as well as public and private clinics. Such education- and health-related 
demands directly affect inclusive human development. The middle income strata is also more 
likely to demand better employment conditions and decent avenues for private entrepreneurs and 
innovations in dominant sectors that indirectly affect inclusive human development. The middle 
income segment also indirectly contributes to inclusive governance by driving some of the 
fundamental aspects of human development such as respect for the environment, human rights 
and civil liberties. 
 Ultimately, because the government needs to finance demands for better public 
commodities, a rising middle income category can directly contribute to financial needs through 
increasing taxation. This inference is consistent with Ferreira et al. (2013) on a World Bank 
study. According to the World Bank report, the Latin American experience can apply to Africa 
such that the middle income fraction becomes a driving force for progress by contributing to tax-
financed inclusive social programmes and policies of redistribution that reduce inequality. 
Overall, middle income would contribute to inclusive governance by driving policies that 
encourage wealth creation in the tertiary, secondary and primary sectors of the economy.  
 Fourth, it is very likely that the middle-income status of African countries plays a role in 
international funding policies because they may be less eligible for International Development 
Assistance (IDA). Therefore, foreign aid would need to be tailored more towards low income-
countries for the post-2015 sustainable development goals of inclusive human development.  
Given ongoing debates on the role of aid on governance in Africa, development assistance 
policies would have to be oriented towards stimulating private enterprise promotion and socially-
inclusive projects.  
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5. Conclusion and further directions 
 This study has examined how income-driven governance affects inclusive development 
in sub-Saharan Africa with data for the period 2000-2012. The empirical evidence is based on 
the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) and Tobit regressions in order to respectively 
control for the persistence in, and limited range of the dependent inclusive human development 
variable. Bundled and unbundled concepts of governance are used: political (voice & 
accountability and political stability/no violence), economic (government effectiveness and 
regulation quality) and institutional (corruption-control and the rule of law) governances. The 
main finding is that ‘middle income”-driven governance has a higher effect on inclusive 
development compared with the impact of “low income”-driven governance. It follows that 
compared to low income, middle income is more effective at driving governance for inclusive 
development, notably the: election and replacement of political leaders (or political governance); 
formulation and implementation of policies that deliver public commodities (economic 
governance) and respect by state and citizens of institutions that govern interactions between 
them (institutional governance). Policy implications have been discussed in the light of the 
contemporary relevance of the findings. They are the pivotal role of the middle income category 
in the post-2015 sustainable development agenda and inconsistent strands in the literature and 
foreign aid policies.  
In the light of the above, rising income levels in Africa will contribute to inclusive 
development in the post-2015 agenda because the conception, definition and measurement of 
“inequality-adjusted human development” employed as the  outcome indicator in this study is in 
line with at least six of the seventeen SDGs, namely: Goal 1(‘end poverty in all its forms 
everywhere’), Goal 2 (‘end hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote 
sustainable agriculture’); Goal 3 (‘ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all ages’); 
Goal 4 (‘ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning 
opportunities for all’); Goal 8 (‘promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, 
full and productive employment and decent work for all’ ) and Goal 10 (reduce inequality within 
and among countries)3 (Asongu & le Roux, 2017). 
 For the above middle income category to be built, policies should be designed to reduce 
inequality ex-ante in order for growth to benefit a burgeoning middle income strata that would 
                                                          
3 The interested reader can refer to Michel (2016), for a full list of SDGs. 
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ultimately result in inclusive human development. The ex-ante recommendation is based on the 
premise that the response of poverty to growth is a decreasing function of inequality (Fosu, 
2010a; Fosu, 2015a). More specifically: “The study finds that the responsiveness of poverty to 
income is a decreasing function of inequality” (Fosu, 2010b, p. 818); “The responsiveness of 
poverty to income is a decreasing function of inequality, and the inequality elasticity of poverty 
is actually larger than the income elasticity of poverty” (Fosu, 2010c, p. 1432); and “In general, 
high initial levels of inequality limit the effectiveness of growth in reducing poverty while 
growing inequality increases poverty directly for a given level of growth” (Fosu, 2011, p. 11). 
By extension, as maintained by   Boushey and Hersh (2012), decreasing inequality is necessary 
for the middle income fraction to exert a substantial positive effect on human development. 
 Future inquiries devoted to enriching the extant literature can focus on investigating the 
established linkages with alternative measurements of the middle income category. The inquiry 
can also be extended to other continents with other measurements of income levels. Moreover, it 
will also be worthwhile for future research to use alternative statistical approaches to assess if the 
established findings withstand empirical scrutiny. When considering such alternative estimation 
techniques, while the adopted GMM technique in this study accounts for simultaneity by 
controlling for potential reverse causality, considering appropriate external instruments is 
essential in articulating a key issue of the paper which is that, the middle income category is a 
cause as much as it is a consequence of development, good governance, and inclusive 
development.  
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Appendices  
Appendix 1: Definitions and sources of variables  
    
Variables  Signs  Definitions  Sources 
    
Inclusive 
development 
IHDI Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index UNDP 
    
 
Political 
Stability  
 
PolS 
“Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as the perceptions 
of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or 
overthrown by unconstitutional and violent means, including domestic 
violence and terrorism”. 
 
WDI 
    
 
Voice & 
Accountability  
 
VA 
“Voice and accountability (estimate): measures the extent to which a 
country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government 
and to enjoy freedom of expression, freedom of association and a free 
media” 
 
WDI 
    
Political 
Governance  
Polgov First Principal Component of Political Stability and Voice & 
Accountability; the process by which those in authority are  
selected and replaced. 
PCA 
    
 
Government 
Effectiveness  
 
 
GE 
“Government effectiveness (estimate): measures the quality of public 
services, the quality and degree of independence from political 
pressures of the civil service, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of governments’ commitments to 
such policies”. 
 
 
WDI 
    
 
Regulation 
Quality 
 
RQ 
“Regulation quality (estimate): measured as the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector development”. 
 
WDI 
    
Economic 
Governance  
Ecogov “First Principal Component of Government Effectiveness and 
Regulation Quality. The capacity of government to formulate & 
implement policies and to deliver services”.  
PCA 
    
 
Corruption-
Control 
 
 
CC 
“Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions of the extent to 
which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty 
and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by 
elites and private interests” 
 
WDI 
    
 
Rule of Law  
 
RL 
“Rule of law (estimate): captures perceptions of the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society and in 
particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” 
 
 
WDI 
    
Institutional 
Governance  
Instgov First Principal Component of Rule of Law and Corruption-Control. 
The respect for citizens and the state of institutions  
that govern the interactions among them 
PCA 
    
GDP per capita  GDPpcg GDP per Capita growth rate  
    
Private Credit  Credit Private credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions (% of 
GDP) 
WDI 
    
Remittance  Remit  Remittance inflows (% of GDP) WDI 
    
Foreign 
investment 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment net inflows (% of GDP) WDI 
    
Middle Income MiddleI Lower and Upper Middle Income Countries ($1,006 or more) Asongu 
(2014, 
p. 364) 
   
Low Income  Low I Low Income Countries  ($1,005 or less) 
    
UNDP: United Nations Development Program. WDI: World Development Indicators. GDP: Gross Domestic Product.  
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Appendix 2: Summary statistics 
      
 Mean SD Min Max Obs 
Inequality Adj. Human Development  0.721 3.505 0.129 0.768 485 
Political Stability  -0.543 0.956 -3.323 1.192 578 
Voice & Accountability  -0.646 0.737 -2.233 0.990 578 
Political Governance  0.000 1.292 -3.440 2.583 578 
Government Effectiveness  -0.771 0.620 -2.450 0.934 577 
Economic Governance  0.002 1.367 -4.049 3.807 577 
Regulation Quality -0.715 0.644 -2.665 0.983 578 
Corruption-Control -0.642 0.591 -1.924 1.249 579 
Rule of Law  -0.741 0.662 -2.668 1.056 578 
Institutional Governance  0.0002 1.364 -3.588 3.766 578 
GDP per Capita growth  2.198 5.987 -49.761 58.363 608 
Private Domestic Credit 18.551 22.472 0.550 149.78 507 
Remittances  3.977 8.031 0.000 64.100 434 
Net Foreign Direct Investment Inflows 5.332 8.737 -6.043 91.007 603 
Low Income (Without NOI) 0.632 0.482 0.000 1.000 637 
Middle Income (Without NOI) 0.367 0.482 0.000 1.000 637 
Low Income (With NOI) 0.627 0.484 0.000 1.000 287 
Middle Income (With NOI) 0.372 0.484 0.000 1.000 287 
      
SD: Standard deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obs: Observations. Adj: Adjusted. NOI : Non 
Overlapping Intervals.  
 
Appendix 3: Correlation Matrix (Uniform sample size: 310) 
               
Governance Variables  Control Variables  Dep. Vble  
PolS VA Polgov GE RQ Ecogov CC RL Instgov GDPpcg Credit Remit FDI IHDI  
1.000 0.688 0.923 0.653 0.625 0.674 0.692 0.777 0.763 -0.011 0.279 0.032 -0.018 0.411 PolS 
 1.000 0.914 0.774 0.734 0.779 0.683 0.810 0.775 0.113 0.452 0.042 -0.010 0.361 VA 
  1.000 0.775 0.753 0.789 0.748 0.863 0.837 0.053 0.396 0.041 -0.015 0.421 Polgov 
   1.000 0.877 0.972 0.836 0.897 0.900 0.118 0.543 0.020 -0.152 0.584 GE 
    1.000 0.965 0.799 0.856 0.860 -0.0001 0.532 -0.076 -0.192 0.512 RQ 
     1.000 0.845 0.906 0.909 0.064 0.555 -0.036 -0.177 0.568 Ecogov 
      1.000 0.851 0.962 0.053 0.469 -0.196 -0.104 0.519 CC 
       1.000 0.961 0.070 0.471 0.079 -0.084 0.507 RL 
        1.000 0.064 0.489 -0.062 -0.098 0.534 Instgov 
         1.000 0.029 0.026 0.172 0.077 GDPpcg 
          1.000 -0.095 -0.082 0.536 Credit 
           1.000 0.122 -0.043 Remit 
            1.000 -0.026 FDI 
             1.000 IHDI 
               
PolS: Political Stability. VA: Voice & Accountability. Polgov: Political Governance.  GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: Regulation Quality. 
Ecogov: Economic Governance. CC: Corruption-Control. RL: Rule of Law. Instgov: Institutional Governance.  GDPpcg : GDP per capita growth 
rate. Credit: Private domestic credit. Remit: Remittances. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. IHDI: Inequality Adjusted Human Development 
Index. Dep. Vble: Dependent Variable.     
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